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Why Imagined Economies? 
John Clarke 
 
Pre-publication version of chapter for Jessica Fischer and Gesa Stedman 
(eds) Imagined Economies, Real Fictions: New Perspectives on Eco-
nomic Thinking in Great Britain.  Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, Culture 
and Theory:  Volume 210, pp. 17-34. 2020. 
 
I begin with a puzzle: why talk about imagined economies? In everyday 
life, economies appear to be exactly the opposite of ‘imagined’: they are 
material, substantial, overpowering, forceful and constantly demanding 
our attention. Indeed, we are immersed in economies: we inhabit a 
global economy, a regional economy, a national economy (and live with 
the unsettling intersection between them). More abstractly, there are dis-
cussions about financial economies (and their opposite ‘real econo-
mies’); the learning economy and the knowledge economy are offered 
as new formations; some talk about the relationships between the Global 
North and South in terms of neo-colonial economies. In other settings, 
including academic ones, people have talked and written of political 
economies, moral economies and social economies, while more re-
cently, I have encountered ideas of cultural economies, affective econo-
mies and domestic economies. This feels like a lot of economies and one 
of the things that adding the word ‘imagined’ does for me is to interrupt 
the apparent ubiquity of economies: it creates what might be called ‘a 
pause for thought’. Such a pause for thought is potentially productive 
given the ubiquity and omnipotence of the economy and all these econ-
omies. 
 
Thinking about imagined economies creates the possibility of ques-
tioning both the proliferation of economies and the assumed potency of 
the Economy (in the singular). From being one social domain among 
many (politics, culture, sociality, the state, etc.), the Economy now com-
mands the stage, such that those other domains now appear subordinate 
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or even subservient to the Economy and its needs. For many this is as-
sociated with the rise of neoliberalism as a political and ideological pro-
ject that includes what Harvey calls the ‘commodification of everything’ 
(Harvey, 165). The dominance of the Economy (and its shadow self – 
logics of economic calculation) have transformed social, political and 
cultural domains, subjecting them to the rule of the market, either in the 
direct form of ‘market forces’, or through the creation of quasi-markets 
(forms of regulation that aim to mimic the dynamics of ‘real’ markets 
via mechanisms of competition and contracting [Le Grand]). I will come 
back to markets later, but for now, they form part of the sheer cultural 
weight of the Economy in its singular forcefulness: the proclaimed ab-
sence of any alternative to the logic of the economy’s need to grow and 
be unbounded, especially its need to be liberated from state regulation 
or political interference. This logic of ‘economic realism’ – summed up 
in Margaret Thatcher’s famous phrase ‘There Is No Alternative’ (TINA) 
– has dominated debates about social reform, public spending and the 
role of the state on a global scale (both in terms of its spread across 
countries and its domination of global institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Federation, the World Bank and the World Trade Or-
ganization). 
 
For a brief period, the global financial crisis of 2007-8 threatened to 
unlock this economic realist logic, but by 2010 the various rescue mis-
sions (designed to save capitalism from itself) had restored the condi-
tions for ‘business as usual’ and much of the world became subject to a 
new form of economic realism – Austerity politics and policies (see, in-
ter alia, Evans and McBride; Forkert). Austerity announced the eco-
nomic necessity (in the form of public debt) for reductions in public 
spending, the greater privatization of the public realm and the reform of 
welfare provisions. The needs of the Economy had to be put first. This 
voracious and needy Economy circulates in the form of representations: 
images, ideas, moral tales, official reports, statistical indices, graphs and 
charts and the ubiquitous stock exchange data (addressing us as mem-
bers of a ‘share owning society’). But these representations both demand 
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our attention (as the basic stuff of life) and simultaneously demand our 
critical attention. As David Ruccio has argued:  
 
The fact is, there are diverse representations of the economy – what it is, how it 
operates, how it is intertwined with the rest of the natural and social world, what 
concepts are appropriate to analyzing it, and so on – in all three arenas: within 
the official discipline of economics, in academic departments and research cen-
ters other than departments of economics within colleges and universities, and in 
activities and institutions outside the academy. And the diversity of economic 
representations that exists in these arenas simply cannot be reduced to or cap-
tured by a singular definition, including the all-too-common statements about 
‘how economists think’ or what the ‘central economic question is’ that one finds 
in the textbooks that are used every year, around the world, to teach hundreds of 
thousands of students how to think about the economy – in other words, how to 
represent the economy, to themselves and others. (895-6) 
 
As a result, I suggest that there is social and political value in taking a 
step back from the ever-present demands of His Majesty the Economy 
and opening up a small space for thought by inserting the word ‘imag-
ined’ into our thinking about economies. This conceptual move has be-
come increasingly visible across the social sciences, even if both the ob-
ject being ‘imagined’ and the practices of imagining are rather different. 
For example, writers as different as Cornelius Castoriadis and Charles 
Taylor have explored ‘social imaginaries’, while writers like Davina 
Cooper have explored how imagining might function as a social and po-
litical practice. Benedict Anderson famously deconstructed nations as 
‘imagined communities’ and states have been examined as imagined for-
mations following Abrams’ formative exploration of the ‘state idea’ 
(see, for example, Blom Hansen and Stepputat; Cooper et al.; Mitchell; 
Painter). Finally, some scholars have begun the exploration of imagined 
economies (Cameron and Palan, in relation to globalization; see also 
Clarke, “Imagined, Real”). For me, one critical point of orientation has 
always been Louis Althusser’s thesis that “[i]deology represents the im-
aginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” 
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(162). How else do we understand our conditions of existence (economic 
and more) except through imaginary relationships? It is true that a whole 
set of problems flow from Althusser’s proposition – about the character 
of ideology; the nature of the real conditions and more, but those are for 
another time. Here, I want to underline both the diversity and productiv-
ity of approaches to the imagined and imaginary quality of social phe-
nomena. The singular Economy has a number of richly imagined ele-
ments – it is productive (and centred on the labour of production); it is 
embodied in private property (as wealth, capital or simply the skills that 
the individual can bring to bear in the market); it is driven by the promise 
of endless growth and it relies (in theory) on the market to solve the 
problems of distribution (everything and everyone achieves their value 
in the market place). In the following sections, I consider the imagined 
nature of the market that has been central to the processes of economic 
realism and neo-liberalisation. In the final section, I return to some of 
these issues (production, private property, the promise of growth and the 
politics of distribution) to explore the possibility of thinking economies 
otherwise. 
 
MAKING UP MARKETS 
 
The drive to open up the world to markets involved imagining econo-
mies in particular ways, centred on a contrast between the shackled 
‘managed economies’ of post-war Fordism (driven into decline by ex-
cessive state interference) and the liberated dynamics of a ‘free market’, 
understood as the ‘natural’ state of the economy. Rescuing the market 
from its oppressors would, we were promised, ensure freedom (of 
choice) and entrepreneurialism, uniting producers and consumers in a 
dynamic of expansive growth. Thomas Frank has written about the com-
pelling rise of market imagery and the way it envisages the market as 
being able to meet all human needs, articulated by ‘market populists’ 
who were 
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adherents of a powerful new political mythology that had arisen from the ruins 
of the thirty-year backlash. Their fundamental faith was a simple one. The market 
and the people – both understood as grand principles of social life rather than 
particulars – were essentially one and the same. By its very nature the market 
was democratic, perfectly expressing the popular will through the machinery of 
supply and demand, poll and focus group, superstore and Internet. In fact, the 
market was more democratic than any of the formal institutions of democracy – 
elections, legislatures, government. The market was a community. The market 
was infinitely diverse, permitting without prejudice the articulation of any and 
all tastes and preferences. Most importantly of all, the market was militant about 
its democracy. It had no place for snobs, for hierarchies, for elitism, for pretense, 
and it would fight these things by its very nature. (29) 
 
The market, in these imaginaries, was endlessly dynamic, driving eco-
nomic, social and political change as people were themselves liberated 
from their state of dependency (on the state). One critical element of this 
re-imagining of the relationships between markets, states and societies 
was provided by public choice theory, which offered a market-centric 
critique of public service ‘monopolies’ (Niskanen). Public choice theory 
demonstrated that, without the discipline of market dynamics (competi-
tion) public monopolies would be sclerotic and inefficient, serving the 
vested interests of producers (see, for example, Friedman and Fried-
man’s critique of the ‘tyranny of the status quo’). Across economic text 
books, policy programmes and political discourse, the markets that pop-
ulated this imagined economy were startlingly similar, resembling noth-
ing so much as a projection of how markets might work if abstracted 
from any social and economic conditions. These abstracted markets 
were abstracted from the material effects of time and space – as if ex-
changes took place instantaneously (and between perfectly informed 
transactors). Even if particular markets showed evidence of failure (the 
housing market or the internal market introduced into UK health ser-
vices, for example), their conditions of failure were always particular. 
The Stanford professor (and Kaiser Permanente healthcare corporation 
advisor) Alain Enthoven’s relationship to the NHS perfectly captures 
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this tendency. As one of the original advisors on marketising NHS re-
form he promoted the internal market (Reflections); he later returned to 
review progress and was rather disappointed (In Pursuit), suggesting 
that the initial reforms did not go far enough in marketising health care. 
This is reminiscent of Jamie Peck’s argument that we need to consider 
the ‘turgid reality of neoliberalism variously failing and flailing for-
wards’ (7; my emphasis). 
 
This recurrent celebration of the market as the natural and necessary 
human condition (as against the artificiality and ‘social engineering’ as-
sociated with the state) was a powerful force in normalising the many 
markets that were created from the mid-1970s onwards. But the natural-
ising imagery tends to conceal the fact that markets of many different 
kinds are the result of social and political labour: they have to be made, 
as Julia Elyachar has argued: 
 
The notion of the market is so familiar that we tend to take it for granted. But 
like so many things that we take for granted, we don’t really know what it is. 
“The market” functions as a folk concept more than a scientific term… Rather 
than the market, we need to think about a multiplicity of markets that are the 
outcomes of specific forms of labor, culture, technological mixes, and modes of 
organization specific to time and place. (Elyachar 15, 24) 
 
In particular, it is important to recognise that markets and market-mim-
icking devices (internal contracting, quasi-markets, etc.) require people 
to understand themselves as specific sorts of economic agents (moti-
vated and empowered by economic means). Anthropological work on 
markets, such as Elyachar’s, suggests that economic agents are not born, 
but have to be made. A study of ‘citizen-consumers’ in England revealed 
people who were profoundly reluctant to identify themselves as ‘con-
sumers of public services’, rejecting the impersonal and transactional 
model that such an identity implied (Clarke et al, 2007). Enabling people 
to think economically, and especially to imagine themselves as eco-
nomic agents, involves a process of construction that requires intensive 
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political and discursive work (this section draws on Newman and 
Clarke, chapter 4). For example, the reform of public services through 
market mechanisms involved the invention of a range of economic 
agents, each invested with a specific form of power or authority; for in-
stance:  
 
• Provider organisations were invited to imagine themselves as a busi-
ness, or at least as performing in ‘business-like’ ways;  
• Senior figures in organisations are invited to understand themselves 
as chief executives, strategic managers or, most recently, leaders. 
Across the range of public services, this development of senior, stra-
tegic, innovative or even transformational management is one of the 
long-term and now deeply embedded effects of the ‘new managerial-
ism’. The proliferation of training and development programmes di-
rected at senior organisational strata encourage two related phenom-
ena: a self-consciousness of being a leader (in the generic sense); and 
a sense of being the embodiment of the specific corporate entity 
(providing the vision that motivates others, being the bulwark against 
external dangers and threats, anticipating the opportunities to ‘grow 
the business’).  
• Clients, contractors and commissioners were invited to see themselves 
as purchasers or providers of services. Ideas of how to contract (and 
manage contracts when established) became part of a new organisa-
tional culture, and led to changing relationships (inter-organisational, 
intra-organisational and inter-personal) that came to be characterised 
by mutual exploitation, uncertainty and adaptation. 
• Workers in organisations were invited to understand themselves as 
(more or less) valued human resources. In particular, they were ex-
pected to imagine themselves as corporate agents – assimilating and 
executing the organisation’s ‘mission’. This identification generated 
particular sorts of strain in public service organisations, given the his-
toric centrality of bureau-professional roles in which identifications 
and affiliations tended to be directed as much to the profession as to 
the specific employing organisation (teachers, social workers, medical 
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staff, etc). The pressure on organisations to ‘think like a business’ in-
creased demands for such corporate identification from employees, 
since professional attachments risked being a distraction from the or-
ganisation’s conception of its ‘core business’.  
 
The making of markets involved a process of redrawing boundaries, re-
constructing relationships, and inventing new assemblages rather than a 
simple process of moving from state to market. The process worked 
through a universalising discourse, albeit one that has not been uni-
formly successful: people retain attachments to other principles of social 
life (intimacy, solidarity, publicness, politics) as alternatives to market 
coordination. People also develop emergent conceptions of alternatives 
in the face of the failures, costs and consequences of market coordina-
tion. Such processes of reform have produced strange new forms of or-
ganization, regulation, coordination and governance, often described as 
‘hybrids’. Elyachar rightly argues that the process of making markets 
(or, we might add, market-mimicking processes) is inherently political. 
 
The labor of making particular forms of markets is also the labor of politics. It is 
about power. Attempts to teach the poor of Cairo to budget their time and money 
with more streamlined methods resembling those of capitalist forms, and to learn 
accounting, “the language of business” […], are more than ethnographic anom-
alies. They are attempts to reshape the nature of power and subjectivity. (El-
yachar 24) 
 
Elyachar’s argument here is important: the work of imagining – making 
up – markets is not merely abstract invention or the circulation of ideol-
ogy; rather new forms of power and relationships are brought into being 
and distributed through such processes. The decentralization of govern-
mental authority to multiple service providers is one example – highly 
conditional and delimited authority is devolved by central government 
to such organisations. Their exercise of it is subject to double pressures: 
the demands and desires of service users and would-service users on the 
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one side; the apparatuses of inspection and evaluation on the other. Nev-
ertheless, as Pollitt and others have shown, the managers of organisa-
tions ‘liberated’ from direct central or local government control have 
often relished the ‘freedom to manage’. Similarly, citizens as service us-
ers are ‘empowered’ or authorised as consumers to exercise choice over 
services (in terms of patient or parent choice and in such policy devel-
opments as direct payments for social care). But there are also realign-
ments of forms of political and economic power at stake in these pro-
cesses (or what others have called forms of public and private authority, 
see Hansen and Salskov-Iversen). These realignments sometimes in-
volve transfers of power and resources (from the state to corporate bod-
ies); they sometimes involve creating fusions or hybrid forms of power 
(trusts, public private partnerships, social enterprise). 
 
Finally, it might be worth noting an odd disjuncture that occurred in 
the ways in which markets have been represented in public discourse. 
The drive to make up markets stressed their dynamism, their efficacy 
and their energy – markets were transformative institutions. However, 
by 2008-9 it seemed that markets were not what they used to be. They 
had become a shadow of their former virile selves, no longer relentlessly 
expanding but slipping into a period of decline, decay and, above all, 
depression. Depression is an intriguing term in relation to markets be-
cause it condenses two rather different, but significant, clusters of mean-
ings. On the one hand, we encounter the hard evidentiary science of eco-
nomics – in which depression refers to a specified trend in economic 
activity, measurable by a set of particular (if contested) indicators. De-
pressions – like the Great Depression of the 1930s – are profound and 
prolonged slumps in economic activity. On the other hand, depression is 
also a key word for describing mental states, emotional moods and clin-
ical psychological conditions. The exchange between these two sites of 
depression – the economic and the emotional – is intriguing. And there 
is something fascinating about the proliferation of terms that usually de-
scribe mental states and emotional moods to talk about the state of mar-
kets. After the 2008-9 crisis, we have become accustomed to hearing 
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about markets that are anxious, nervous, and unsettled. They are, it 
seems, prone to bouts of panic and hysteria in which they are infected 
by collective mood swings and a sort of viral irrationality. These mood 
swings of markets – moments of manic recovery offset by plummeting 
spirits – threaten to lead us all into depression. And they undermine the 
claims about dynamism, rationality and the transcendent power of mar-
kets.  
 
IMAGINING OTHERWISE 
 
However, the purpose of talking about imagined economies is not just 
to engage in a challenge to the current dominant imaginaries (a sort of 
ideology critique). As important is creating the political cultural space 
for imagining other economies, or even for imagining economies other-
wise. In this section I explore some other possible ways of imagining 
economies: working through different framing devices – economy as re-
production rather than production; economy as commons rather than pri-
vate property; the possibility of post-growth economies rather than end-
less growth; and the economy as the focus for a politics of distribution 
rather than market valuation. I do not claim any great originality about 
my selection of these issues or my comments on them – but they offer 
significant contending imaginaries. 
 
How different might economies look if we start from the question of 
reproduction rather than production? By this I do not mean the simple 
model offered in Volume One of Marx’s Capital of the reproduction of 
the social relations of production and their embodiments – capital and 
labour, but an understanding that social reproduction is necessarily ex-
panded and expansive (it is a dynamic process). It is necessarily complex 
– requiring the reproduction of all social relations – and it is also con-
tested. Contested reproduction implies that both the content of what is 
reproduced and the means by which it is reproduced are, in principle, 
always open to contestation. Being open to contestation does not mean 
that everything is always and continually in flux. Rather, conflicts arise 
Why imagined economies? | 15 
around particular axes of reproduction in specific sites and become re-
solved – temporarily – into forms of settlement, resembling what Gram-
sci described as the ‘life of the state’: a ‘series of unstable equilibria’. 
The existence of heterogeneous social relations within concrete societies 
further implies that we have to think about diverse social forces – and 
their potential for political mobilization – instead of making the assump-
tion that the only social forces that matter are class forces. The history 
of social reproduction reveals a range of struggles – from the efforts of 
organised labour to win ‘free time’ or protections against market dynam-
ics and market failure, through the struggles of women’s organisations 
over the conditions, costs and consequences of child bearing, to the cit-
izenship rights of groups who have been historically excluded, margin-
alised and subordinated – such rights being one of the collective condi-
tions of social reproduction. In short, the field of the social (that which 
has to be reproduced) is itself both complex and contested. Such a start-
ing point would make more visible than usual the work that has to be 
done to ensure this reproduction – and what happens when that care fails 
to take place. Brigitte Aulenbacher has argued that from this starting 
point we might understand care as the fundamental social practice: that 
without care, nothing – neither people nor the environment – can be ad-
equately reproduced and both suffer profoundly from the carelessness 
of capitalism (Aulenbacher; Aulenbacher et al.). 
 
This understanding of social and material relations as the focal points 
of economies provides a link to the second imaginary – the idea of the 
commons. Commoning refers to real practices of governing natural re-
sources for collective use and a political imaginary of how social life 
might be organized. Peter Linebaugh has argued for the importance of 
understanding ‘the commons’ as an active process. 
 
To speak of the commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at best 
and dangerous at worst – the commons is an activity and, if anything, it expresses 
relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to nature. It might be 
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better to keep the word as a verb, an activity, rather than as a noun, a substantive’ 
(2007: 279) 
 
Since Eleanor Ostrom and others challenged Hardin’s 1968 description 
of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the view that common resources were 
inevitably undermined by the pursuit of economic self-interest), interest 
in commoning has grown. It has combined investigation of existing 
practices of commoning, the articulation of policies and procedures for 
‘governing the commons’ and the development of a politics of common-
ing as an anti-individualist, anti-capitalist ecological economics. It has 
also been extended into debates about whether a ‘social commons’ can 
be imagined, in which questions of social protection and welfare can be 
rethought as communal resources and rights (see, inter alia, Barbagallo 
and Federici; Mestrum; F. Williams). Mestrum has suggested that 
 
[w]hen welfare states or social protection are perceived as commons, after a de-
fining and regulating process, they can contribute to collective and individual 
welfare, as emerging from collective and participatory action. The commons sus-
tain our common being, our being together, our co-existence. They go beyond 
individual interests. (6) 
 
Two lines of questioning follow from these imaginaries. The first, which 
reflects the centrality of environmental questions to both reproduction 
and commoning, asks whether we can imagine a ‘post-growth econ-
omy’. What Aulenbacher calls ‘careless’ capitalism has been built on 
the presumption of endless growth – the promise that there are always 
new needs to be discovered, new markets to be created, new resources 
to be mined (literally and metaphorically) and new sources of labour to 
be put to work. The global crisis that threatens to engulf us all, and its 
local instantiations (unbreathable air, rising water levels, deforestation, 
species extermination and more) point precisely to the unsustainability 
of that economic imaginary. A range of approaches have been developed 
as ways of living without growth from Bookchin’s post-scarcity anar-
chism to the Post Growth Institute. Bookchin argued that 
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[u]nless we realize that the present market society, structured around the brutally 
competitive imperative of ‘grow or die’, is a thoroughly impersonal, self-operat-
ing mechanism, we will falsely tend to blame technology as such or population 
growth as such for environmental [and social] problems. We will ignore their 
root causes, such as trade for profit, industrial expansion, and the identification 
of ‘progress’ with corporate self-interest. In short, we will tend to focus on the 
symptoms of a grim social pathology rather than on the pathology itself, and our 
efforts will be directed toward limited goals whose attainment is more cosmetic 
than curative. (463) 
 
The direction and political-cultural dynamics of a post-growth economy 
remain contested (see, for example, some of the discussion in the special 
issue of the journal ephemera: http://www.ephemerajournal.org/is-
sue/organizing-post-growth-economy). But the urgency of the questions 
that are posed there continue to increase as environmental crises multi-
ply and their implications for population movements become more vis-
ible. 
 
The second line of questions intersect forcefully with the first, since 
they concern the future politics of distribution. Ferguson and Li have 
recently suggested that we have come to the end of two potent economic 
imaginaries: in the global north the degradation of waged work, the rise 
of precarity and the rise of automation have meant the end of the ‘proper 
job’ (even as Work is increasingly fetishized as the fundamental human 
activity). In the global south, the ‘myth of development’ is no longer 
sustainable (even as it is recycled in new forms). Neither promise – the 
proper job or urbanising development - can be fulfilled. Indeed, each 
promise was, even in its heyday, only ever selectively and partially de-
livered. In the present though, the question of how people might live and 
how they might make a living, are increasingly pressing matters, locally, 
nationally and globally – and they demand new ways of thinking about 
the social surplus and how to control and distribute it. 
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I have tried to outline one set of things that come into view if we 
consider imagined economies (others are, of course, imaginable). The 
necessary starting point for me is the unlocking of the projected eco-
nomic realism that underpins and constantly demands our acquiescence 
to the contemporary imagined economy (the ‘real’ economy). Under-
standing the myths, stories, fantasies and fictions that work to sustain 
the apparent necessity of the dominant way of ‘doing’ the economy is a 
necessary critical moment. But, as Raymond Williams argued, it is im-
portant to look beyond the dominant to see the residual and emergent 
cultural-political forms that intersect and struggle with it. I have said 
little about the residual, although another essay might have explored 
ideas of the ‘real economy’ (in a world of immaterial flows); the nostal-
gia for ‘proper jobs’ (and its correlate ‘real men’, perhaps); the lingering 
attachment to ideas of social security and social protection (rather than 
thinly punitive welfare); and the varieties of imagined moral economies, 
ruled by principles of fairness and ‘just deserts’, and constrained by the 
obligations of employers as well as workers. Here, though, I have tried 
to concentrate on the ‘emergent’ – economies imagined otherwise 
around questions of reproduction, care, the commons, the ecological cri-
sis and the politics of distribution. These are not simple fantasies (as 
economic realists would insist) nor do they form an integrated and co-
herent political programme. They ask that we think – and act – other-
wise. And that is the best possible reason I can find for exploring imag-
ined economies. 
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